Providing Solution for Neff and Chaum Protocols in E-Voting Machines Based on Security Analysis

The With a recent of reports criticizing the trustworthiness of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, computer scientists have not been able to allay voters’ concerns about this critical infrastructure. The problems are manifold: poor use of cryptography, buffer overflows, at least one study, poorly commented code. Given these problems, how can we reason about, or even prove, security properties of voting machines? Andrew Neff and David Chaum have recently proposed revolutionary schemes for DRE-based electronic voting. The centerpiece of these schemes consists of novel and sophisticated cryptographic protocols that allow voters to verify their votes are cast and counted correctly. But In our analysis of these cryptographic schemes, we found two important weaknesses: subliminal channels in the encrypted ballots and problems resulting from human unreliability in cryptographic protocols. These two weaknesses in these voting protocols became apparent when malicious DREs behave arbitrarily. In this paper we represent a new scheme, BSBSN, that can mitigate those weaknesses. Also it prevents from those behaviors by using the representation of a new authority named SAA and increases the security of Neff's and Chaum's schemes. This scheme doesn't have any overhead on system.